KC Auditor + Ombuds Feasibility Study: County Lacks Independent Fraud Investigation Capacity, IG Would Cost $850K-$2.3M/Year
What Council asked for
Ordinance 19978 directed the Auditor and Ombuds to study three oversight mechanisms:
- Inspector general position(s)
- Qui tam provisions
- Independent contract review
Findings: the gaps
The study identifies five gaps in current King County oversight architecture:
| Gap | Finding |
|---|---|
| Fraud investigation | No administrative investigation functions trained for fraud; no standard procedures; investigative authority exists without independence safeguards |
| Qui tam / false claims | No false claims ordinance; no qui tam provisions |
| Inspection authority | Neither Auditor nor Ombuds has explicit inspection program under professional standards; no requirement that all contracts include inspection clauses |
| Reporting system | No centralized intake mechanism for fraud/improper-acts reporting |
| Awareness / training | No mandatory fraud and ethics training; City of Pasadena cited as a peer that requires 20-minute training every two years |
The study describes the existing Auditor and Ombuds as sharing “traits with federal inspectors general without having the same level of authority.”
Cost ranges
| Function | Annual cost range | FTE range |
|---|---|---|
| Fraud investigation capacity | $410K - $1.0M | 1-5 |
| Inspection capacity | $187K - $561K | 1-3 |
| Centralized reporting / hotline | $179K - $721K | 1-3 |
| Combined IG (all three) | $850K - $2.3M | 3.5 - 11 |
| Investigation + reporting only | $660K - $1.7M | 2-7 |
One-time customization (case management system) estimated at $100,000.
What the study recommends
- Create an independent fraud investigation program following professional standards.
- Explicitly create an independent inspection program with inspection clauses required in all grants and contracts.
- Create a centralized reporting system (hotline).
- Require regular fraud risk assessments.
- Mandate fraud and ethics training.
- If Council prefers consolidation: “combining the offices of Auditor and Ombuds would be the most effective” option for a new IG.
What the study declines to recommend
Qui tam. The Prosecuting Attorney opposes it. Interviews with Miami-Dade County and Allegheny County indicated qui tam cases are rare and did not increase reporting of improper payments. The study suggests Council could “consider creating a false claims ordinance without qui tam provisions.”
Peer jurisdictions referenced
- Miami-Dade County OIG (FL) — referred 52% of complaints to other offices, opened investigations on 8% (FY 2025)
- New York City Department of Inspections — embeds staff in agencies
- San Francisco Controller — IG with subpoena power, Prop C expansion
- Seattle OIG — policing oversight only
- Austin City Auditor — Integrity Unit, 6 FTE, 404 reports volume
- Multnomah County Auditor — hotline since 2007
- Allegheny County Controller (qui tam reference point)
Implementation timeline
| Phase | Year |
|---|---|
| Changes begin | 2026-2028 |
| Full operational implementation | 2028 (for some options) |
| Program assessment | 2030 |
Why this matters
This is the document that gives the Dembowski + Dunn IG proposal its numbers. Without this study, the legislative push is a press release; with it, Council has cost ranges, peer comparisons, and a recommended implementation path. The study also documents that, by its authors’ own account, KC’s existing oversight bodies cannot do what an IG does, which is a politically significant admission from the Auditor and Ombuds themselves about the limits of their current authority.
Open questions
- Will Council adopt the combined IG model ($850K-$2.3M) or split it?
- Will Council ignore the qui tam non-recommendation and add it anyway?
- Does the 2026-2028 implementation window survive budget negotiations?
- The study’s authors are also candidates to absorb the new function under a “combine Auditor + Ombuds” model. Is that bias acknowledged?
Pairs with
- KC Inspector General Council proposal (Mar 2026) — the Dembowski + Dunn + Perry legislative response to this feasibility study. This study is the evidentiary spine of that proposal.
- 2025 DCHS Contract Management audit (Aug 2025) — the predicate that triggered the Council to commission this study.
- KC-2026-009 / 010 / 011 / 013 / 015 — KCSO/OLEO accountability arc, the operational backdrop for why fraud investigation capacity matters.